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Sovereignty Versus Space - Public Law and Private Launch 
in the Asian Context* 
D r  Frans G von der Dunk** 
IN the more than forty years which have gone by since the birth of 
space law, there has not been a more revolutionary development than 
the rapidly increasing involvement of private entities in space activi- 
ties. International space law in the narrow sense-essentially five space 
treaties and five United Nations Resolutions on space' constituting 
the  core of the corpus juris spatialis internationalis - developed 
The present paper is for a large part based on the author's contribution to  a 
'Project 2001'- workshop held at UNISPACE 111 in Vienna, July 1999, as well as  
his Private Enterprise i d  Public Interest in the European ' ~ ~ a c e s c a ~ e '  (1998), 
particularly Chapter I1 thereof on thestructural frameworkaspects of international 
space law. 
** Co-Director, lnternational Institute of Air and Space Law 
Leiden, The Netherlands. 
1 This concerns the following treaties and resolutions: 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies 
(hereafter Outer SpaceTreaty), London/Moscow/Washington, adopted 19 
December 1966, opened for signature 27 January 1967, entered into force 
10 October 1967; 6 ILM 386 (1967); 18 UST 2410; TIAS 6347; 610 UNTS 205; 
Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and 
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, London/Moscow/ 
Washington, adopted 19 December 1967, opened for signature 22 April 
1968, entered into force 3 December 1968; 19 UST 7570; TlAS 6599; 672 
UNTS 119; 
Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects 
(hereafter Liability Convention), London/Moscow/Washington, 
adopted 29 November 1971, opened for signature 29 March 1972, entered 
into force 1 September 1972; 10 ILM 965 (1971); 24 UST 2389; TlAS 
7762; 961 UNTS 187; 
W Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (hereafter 
Registration Convention), New York, adopted 12 November 1974, opened 
for signature 14 January 1975, entered into force 15 September 1976; 14 
ILM 43 (1975); 28 UST 695; TlAS 8480; 1023 UNTS 15; 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, New York, adopted 5 December 1979, opened for signature 
18 December 1979, entered into force 11 July 1984; 18 ILM 1434 (1979); 
1363 UNTS 3; 
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for its most fundamental part when only states (and a few international 
organisations) were undertaking space activities in any meaningful 
sense of the word. Its exclusively public character, for example in terms 
of rights and obligations provided for, was a direct consequence of 
this. 
This poses the fundamental question whether international space 
law is adequate to deal with private space activities, and notably to 
balance valid private interests with the general public one in outer 
space and space activities. In other words: are private enterprise's 
interests sufficiently heeded by the body of international space law, 
and are, at the same time, the interests of the public at large sufficiently 
protected against the undesirable (side-) effects of private enterprise's 
entry into outer space? 
This question is perhaps of special importance for Asian countries. 
Traditionally, Asian societies and states have been inclined more than 
eg, European ones to focus upon the general collective, ie, public, 
benefits of any economic activities, including those in outer space. 
In this context, private economic initiatives have often been frowned 
upon, alternatively kept on a short leash. In legal terms, this notion 
of 'the collective' translates largely into the concept of 'sovereignty', 
as a legal tool to  defend a state's interests both on the international 
and on the national plane. 
At the same time, the advance of private enterprise into the space 
arena over the last decade or two has probably been nowhere as marked 
as in Asia. Economic tigers such as Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and 
Thailand, having already considerable experience with the role of 
private enterprise in a general economic sense, a re  increasingly 
Declaration of Legal Principles Governing t h e  Activities of States 
in t h e  Exploration and Use of Outer Space, UNGA Res 1962 (XVIII), 
of 13 December 1963; UN Doc A/AC 105/572/Rev 1, at 37; 
Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for 
International Direct Television Broadcasting, UNCA Res 37/92, of 10 
December 1982; UN Doc A/AC 105/572/Rev 1, at 39; 
Principles Relating to  Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space, 
UNGA Res 41/65, of 3 December 1986; UN Doc A/AC 105/572/Rev 1, at 43; 
Principles Relevant to  the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, 
UNGA Res 47/68, of 14 December 1992; UN Doc A/AC 105/572/Rev 1, at 
47; 
Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of all States, Taking into 
Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries, UNGA Res 51/122, 
of 13 December 1996; (1997) XXII-I Annals of Air and Space Law, a t  556; 
46 Zeitschrift fiir Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1997), at 236. 
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becoming present also in outer space through private and commercial 
participation. Major powers such as India and Indonesia are moving 
away from their traditional distrust of private enterprise and private 
intentions, and structured efforts are under way to facilitate private 
entities' participation in various fields of space activity. Even the 
People's Republic of China is taking fundamental steps to take part 
in an international, read global space economy being increasingly 
liberalised - not in the least in the field of launching. 
Yet, there is an almost complete silence of the aforementioned 
treaties and resolutions of international space law on private entities 
and private activities. For Asian countries, the question of the fitness 
of international space law and its major instruments in dealing with 
the private character of a considerable and growing measure of space 
activities is of crucial importance. As launching in a sense represents 
the key to most other relevant space activities - without launch, 
satellite communications, satellite remote sensing, satellite navi- 
gation or space station operations are not possible - such a general 
analysis applies to this field in particular. 
11. THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 
AND PRIVATE SPACE ACTMTIES 
This issue of 'fitness' in general has to be approached at two levels. 
On the one hand, the question arises whether current international 
space law, by way of the rules, rights and obligations it defines, takes 
into due account both the valid and justified interests of the private 
sector itself, and the specific consequences of private involvement 
in space activities upon the whole human endeavour in space. In other 
words, whether the valid and justified interests of other players as 
well as society and humanity at large are duly considered. 
This could be labelled the 'substantive' approach, since it focuses 
on the substance of contemporary international space law. Whether 
in terms of launching only or more generally for all space activities, 
the special impact of substantive space law rules upon private activities 
would be the subject here. Such an analysis, whilst certainly crucial 
for a beneficial development of further private involvement in outer 
space and launch activities, would overstep the boundaries of this 
paper. By way of illustration, within the context of 'Project 2001', a 
research project undertaken at the University of Cologne in Germany 
together with the German space agency, more than 130 experts from 
around the  world a re  involved in discussing and analysing these 
issues. 
On the other hand, prior to  such analysis the particular structure 
of international space law as a public legal regime also calls for a 
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'structural' approach, preceding analysis of the substance. Whatever 
rules, rights and obligations international space law may be seen to 
provide, whether adequate in substance for dealing with private launch 
and other space activities or not, they are addressed primarily to states, 
and only in somesecondary manner to international- public organisations. 
Thus, the question remains: how, in the abstract, are private entities 
tied or to be tied in to this international legal framework for space 
activities? 
The present paper will focus on this 'structural' question of 
binding private enterprise t o  public space law, and how private 
enterprise must be factored into a consideration of any areas of 
'substance'. This essentially also confines the scope of the present 
paper to the two treaties that elaborate the key concepts structuring 
international space law - the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability 
Convention. 
It is here where launching as one space activity amongst others 
stands out in particular. Not only does it represent the most basic 
spaceactivity in thesense that without launch, few other space activities 
of interest here would be possible; it is through the  launch that the  
most directly quantifiable issue of space activities, the liability 
for damage caused by such activities, is r e g ~ l a t e d . ~  Obviously, from 
a legal perspective this is even more important. 
By way of point of departure, the normative system of international 
space law (the 'substance'), though addressed to states, obviously 
is also applicable to private space activities, which are allowed under 
space law albeit subject to  authorisation (and continuing supervision) 
by a state.3 These private activities should conform to the same rights 
and obligations which public space activities are obliged to comply 
with even if, private enterprise is currently not directly bound by those 
rights and  obligation^.^ Consequently, the task of authorisation and 
continuous supervision rests squarely upon the shoulders of states 
to realise this. 
2 See Art VII, Outer Space Treaty; Art I(c), Liability Convention. These provisions 
define the entitylies liable for damage as a consequence of space activities as 
those states involved in the launch of the space object causing the damage in 
either of the four ways mentioned. See further infra, para 9. 
3 See Art VI, Outer Space Treaty. 
4 See also eg, PL Meredith & CS Robinson. Space Low: A Case Study for the 
Practitioner (1992), 58, 67. 
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At least in theory a state will be inclined to exercise any jurisdiction 
available to it primarily ois4-uis those particular categories of private 
activities for which it can be held accountable under international 
(space) law.5 Such accountability under international space law has 
a twofold character, as it does under general international law. It 
comprises both a general accountability in the form of state respon- 
sibility, and the specific accountability for damage that is provided 
by the phenomenon of state l iabi l i t~.~ 
The two concepts of responsibility and liability as defined under 
space law have a structural component in that they effectively carry 
their own respective definitions regarding the entities for which a 
particular state might be held accountable. For state responsibility, 
this component is essentially dealt with by Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty, whereas liability for damage is largely given shape by Article 
VII of the Outer Space Treaty, as repeated in or supported by provisions 
in the Liability Convention. 
Finally, especially in view of state responsibility, Article V1lI of the 
Outer Space Treaty plays a fundamental role. This touches upon the 
relationship between jurisdiction and the exercise thereof on the one 
hand and the international responsibilities and liabilities on the other 
hand, which provides the basis for any regulation of private space 
activities by individual states for the purpose of international space 
law. 
111. ARTICLES VI AND VIII OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY 
AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty provides that states are inter- 
nationally responsible for 'national activities in outer space', including 
cases where these activities are 'carried on (...) by non-governmental 
entities'. This responsibility pertains to 'assuring that national activi- 
5 Cf eg, B Cheng, The Legal Regime of  Airspace and Outer Space: The Boundary 
Roblem. Functionalism versus Spatialism: The Major Premises, (1980) 5 Annals 
of  Air and Space Law, 340; B Cheng, The Commercial Development o f  Space: the 
Need for New Treaties, (1991) 19 Journal of  Space Law, 37. 
6 See also extensively NUT Horbach, Liability Versus Responsibility Under 
International Law (1996), 20-34, for a fundamental discussion of the two 
concepts as they arise out of national legal orders where they are differently 
interpreted, applied and inter-related, with the consequence that at the 
international level a large measure o f  confusion has arisen as to the scope, 
meaning and consequences in law o f  the respective principles. Thus, experts 
differ for instance fundamentally in their qualification of responsibility and 
liability as primary or secondary obligations under international law. 
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ties are carried out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the 
present Treaty'. With the Outer Space Treaty providing the legal 
framework for all space activities and laying the foundation also for 
further regulation, violation of its terms would amount to violation 
of the outer space legal regime in general. 
Similarly, the general doctrine on state responsibility provides, that 
states are responsible for 'internationally wrongful acts': acts violating 
obligations under international law.' International law in general is held 
to apply also to outer space.s Therefore, under Article VI, the concept 
of state responsibility for activities undertaken in outer space generally 
becomes operative whenever these activities violate obligations under 
international space law. 
In deviation from the general doctrine of state responsibility, under 
the terms of Article VI states are responsible to the same extent for 
private activities as they are for public activities. No exemption from 
international responsibility for private activities can be claimed by 
arguing that a state acted with 'due care'.g Private space activities are 
without further qualification equated, for the purpose of international 
responsibility, to the activities of states. Here, the major impetus arises 
for states to actually take legislative action, for they would have to 
answer internationally for private space activities violating interna- 
tional space law. 
This central presumption underlies the attribution of private space 
activities to states. Article VI then begs the question: for which cat- 
egories of private space activities is which particular state to be held 
responsible on the international plane? The answer to this question 
7 See Arts 1, 3, 4, ILC Draft articles on State responsibility, ILC Y b  1980 Vol 11, 
30-4; further eg, Horbach, 23; 1. Brownlie, The System o f  the Law o f  
Nations (1983), 22-31; K Zemanek, Responsibility o f  States: General 
Principles, 10 Encyclopedia ofPubliclnternationalLaw (1987), 362 f f ;  R Wolfrum, 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, 10 Encyclopedia of  Public International Law (1987), 
271 f f .  
8 See Art Ill, Outer Space Treaty. General public international law functions as 
a lex generalis where the lex specialis of space law itself is moot, unclear or 
open to conflicting interpretation; see M Lachs, The Law o f  Outer Space (1972), 
145, including at note 3; HA Wassenbergh, Principles o f  Outer Space Law in 
Hindsight (1991), 15-6; G Zhukov & Y Kolosov, International Space Law (1984). 
48-9; S Hobe, Die rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der wirtschaflichen Nutzung 
des Weltraum (1992), 75-6. 
9 As to  the doctrine o f  due care responsibility, cf eg, FV Garcia Amador. State 
Responsibility - Some New Problems, (195811) 94 Recueil des Cours, 403-5; 
Zernanek. 368. 
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lies in the interpretation of the two key-terms 'national activities' and 
'appropriate State', and it is here where the first problems arise as 
far as private space activities are concerned. 
IV. THE ROLES OF 'JURISDICTION' AND 'SOVEREIGNTY' IN SPACE 
As referred to, from a logical perspective the most effective interpreta- 
tion of private 'national activities' would make s ta tes  interna- 
tionally responsible precisely for those activities over which they can 
exercise legal control. The opportunity to exercise legal control is 
encompassed in the concept of 'jurisdiction', which is of course a well- 
known fundamental concept of general public (international) law. In 
that context it is in many intricate ways linked to the sovereignty of 
states. 
This brings the analysis to the question of the specific impact on 
space  activities of the concept of sovereignty in general, and 
the  fundamental clause of Article I1 of the Outer Space Treaty in 
particular.1° As t o  the former, sovereignty indeed is in effect 
very much linked directly to territory. The effects of (exclusive!) 
sovereignty are most comprehensively felt on the territory of the 
particular s ta te  a t  issue, to  such an extent that t h e  concepts 
of (territorial) sovereignty and exclusive (territorial) jurisdiction are 
considered to be two sides of the same coin, often used interchange- 
ably. 
What Article I1 for its part therefore really establishes or confirms" 
is that 'national appropriation' of the area of outer space (or any part 
thereof) is not possible, and that such traditional international law- 
concepts as 'occupation' do not apply. Outer space is no terra nullius, 
which can be occupied and incorporated into a certain state's territory. 
Neil Armstrong's planting of the US flag on the moon (not a real flag 
anyway) did not and could never signify that the moon or any part 
thereof had or would become US territory. 
Therefore, the exclusion of sovereignty and legal control by means 
of Article I1 of the  Outer Space Treaty refers t o  t h e  exclusion 
10 Art 11, Outer Space Treaty, provides: 'Outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty; 
by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.' 
11 The choice between 'establishes' or 'confirms' depends upon one's view as to 
whether, in the absence of any explicit provisions in international treaties or 
customary law allowing for (the exercise of) sovereignty, such sovereignty could 
be presumed or not. 
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of sovereignty and legal control on a territorial basis. It did not mean 
that the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty intended to allow a lawless 
void to exist, or even that they allowed for (new) law only to the extent 
the whole community of states could agree thereupon. In legal terms 
it only meant that, for any particular part of outer space, no single 
state could call the tune to which (private) space entrepreneurs would 
have to dance, especially once private enterprises become involved 
in space activities. However, the freedom of outer space and activities 
undertaken therein could and should not be regulated solely on the 
global international level, in view of the difficulties inherent in all the 
world's states agreeing to any elaborate and effective legal regime on 
the private level. 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty thus provided for international 
state responsibility for space activities that could be considered 'national 
activities in outer space' of that particular state. Consequently, it was 
the crucial provision of Article VI on 'authorisation and continuing 
supervision', which leads to the question whether sovereignty, 
in one form or another as a background to or basis for any exercise 
of jurisdiction, still has effect in space in spite of its formal absence. 
V. TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND SPACE ACTIVITIES 
The most direct consequence of a state's sovereignty in general 
international law-terms is the exclusive jurisdiction of any state over 
its territory. 'Territory' here includes the land territory, the internal 
waters, the territorial waters (where the exclusivity of sover- 
eignty oiz, territorial jurisdiction is fundamentally limited only by 
the concept of 'innocent passage') and the airspace above these three 
terrestrial areas. However, outer space itself, as mentioned, is not 
included, and this triggers the question of the relevance of territorial 
jurisdiction. 
Here, one becomes aware of the special character of (most) space 
activities. Manned space flight, ie, with human (and hence also legal) 
persons as actors being themselves in outer space, albeit perhaps the 
most visible category of space activities, concerns only a minor 
part of human activities related to space. Such activities indeed 
could not be subjected to territorial sovereignty and jurisdiction, in 
view of the non-applicability of these concepts to the area of outer 
space. 
The overwhelming part of space activities, however, is actually 
conducted by persons in ground control stations. They push the buttons 
and pull the handles that make a rocket shed its first stage or a 
telecommunications satellite change frequencies out in space. 
In other words: most space activities are 'remote controlled activities' 
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in the sense that the actors undertaking those activities are present 
somewhere on earth whereas the results of their physical actions occur 
far away in outer space. The result is that territorial sovereignty, in 
respect of such 'remote controlled activities', still allows states to 
control activities in outer space in a legal fashion. 
Moreover, from this perspective the category of launch activities 
presents yet another picture. While by definition aimed at outer space, 
so  far all launches in any meaningful sense of the word for their first 
and crucial part do not, geographically speaking, take place in outer 
space. Most of them are even undertaken from 'territory' as such. For 
launch activities, consequently, territorially based jurisdiction 
continues to represent a very effective legal tool for states to control 
private involvement. Even better, of course, such legal control over 
launch activities in turn provides such states with an effective legal 
tool of control over any space activities consecutive to the launch 
proper. 
In view of the responsibility of states under Article VI of the Outer 
Space Treaty for national activities in space, uiz, their responsibility 
t o  authorise and continuously supervise such activities, s tates  
are  thus capable to  control in law the overwhelming majority 
of space activities already by using their territorial jurisdiction in spite 
of the absence of territorial sovereignty in outer space proper. 
VI. PERSONAL JURISD~CTION AND SPACE ACTMTIES 
In addition to the concept of territorial jurisdiction, in general public 
international law a concept of personal jurisdiction exists.'* The power 
to control by law persons and entities because of a nationality is 
certainly an asset of states only: only states can bequeath nationality, 
and only states have the comprehensive right to act on their behalf 
12 When the concept of 'personal jurisdiction' is discussed, one has t o  be aware 
of the further distinction between'activepersonal jurisdictionl(ie, over activities 
undertaken by nationals) and 'passive personal jurisdiction' (ie, over activities 
of which nationals are 'victims'). However, the latter form of personal jurisdiction 
is as  such much more disputed and less developed. Since moreover it does not 
touch upon the legal realm of outer space unless one deals with the quite 
- 
exceptional area of manned space flight (where usually special agreements 
between states concerned are concluded to  deal with such jurisdictional issues), 
it is generally left out of the analysis here. Therefore, references to  personal 
jurisdiction in this paper should henceforth be read as referring to  active 
personal jurisdiction. 
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at the international level.13 Thus, next to the more visible and more 
physical attribute of territorial jurisdiction it, forms a central attribute 
of a state's sovereignty. 
In general international law, limits to this principle of personal 
jurisdiction are only provided in the sense that under'certain circum- 
stances, the opposability of nationality of certain persons or entities 
t o  third states may be subject to discussion, if international conflicts 
on jurisdictional issues are at  ~take. '~Also, the monitoring and enforce- 
ment of laws and regulations basing themselves upon this principle 
of personal jurisdiction depend upon the actual presence of the person 
or entity on the territory of the state concerned, uiz, upon treaties 
o r  arrangements with states where such persons or entities are actually 
present.Is 
There is nothing in international space law however that further 
limits or even contradicts the application of the concepts of nationality 
and personal jurisdiction to outer space. Astronauts do not loose their 
nationality because of their presence outside of any state's territory 
any more than a sailor looses his nationality on the high seas. Con- 
sequently, national laws - in subservience to  the 'authorisation and 
continuing supervision' required by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty 
- can continue to be used for exercising legal control over space 
activities. 
Naturally, the same applies also, firstly, to human actors not them- 
selves in outer space. An American engineer controlling spacecraft 
from Russian territory does not loose his nationality merely for that 
reason, and consequently remains in principle subjected to US juris- 
diction on a personal basis. In view of the concurrent jurisdiction of 
the Russian Federation on the basis of the territorial criterion, the 
13 To a limited extent general international law has accepted the notion of certain 
intergovernmental organisations to  act on behalf of certain individuals, namely 
to the extent that these are to  be considered officials of that organisation; cf 
Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory 
Opinion, International Court of Justice, 11 April 1949, ICJ Rep 1949, 174. This, 
obviously, is still a long way from granting anything like an 'international 
nationality' or derogating from the nationality of the persons concerned. 
14 Cfthe Nottebohm Case (Second Phase)(Liechtenstein v Guatemala), International 
Court of Justice, 6 April 1955, ICJ Rep 1955, 4. 
15 An obvious example would consist of the manifold bilateral extradition treaties 
that exist in today's world, as  well as  some multilateral treaties providing for 
aut dedere aut judicare-provisions. 
32 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative Law (2001) 
obvious possibility of a conflict on competence arises. However, this 
is of course not uncommon in general international law. It is usually 
solved along the lines of priority of territorial jurisdiction over personal 
jurisdiction at least when it comes to adjudication or enforcement, 
alternatively by means of special agreements between t h e  s tates  
concerned.16 The same tableau of solutions presents itself to any 
jurisdictional conflict pertaining to space activities and space law. 
The continuing legal validity of nationality in outer space applies 
also, secondly, to legal persons undertaking space activities. The 
nationality of companies active in the space arena is not differently 
determined from that of those active in other fields." 
States as a consequence can exercise their personal jurisdiction 
to control by law any company incorporated and headquartered in 
their respective territories,18 even if that company's activities proper 
are taking place in outer space and/or are conducted from outside 
the state's territory. Of course, dealing with adjudication and/or 
enforcement remains another matter. 
VII. REGISTRATION-BASED JURISDICTION AND SPACE ACTMTIES 
In addition to territorial jurisdiction and persona1 jurisdiction, a third, 
space law-specific approach to law-making in space has been elabo- 
rated which takes the concept of nationality one step further. Article 
VlII of the Outer Space Treaty provides for the duty for certain states 
to register space objects. Whilst the term 'nationality' is carefully 
avoided in this context, the effect of registration of a space object 
for all practical purposes can be compared to that of registration and 
the consequent nationality of ships and aircraft.Ig For a start, the 
16 Examples would concern multilateral or  bilateral treaties regarding personal 
immunities. 
17 Art 111, Outer Space Treaty, confirms that rules of general public international 
law continue to  apply to  outer space and space activities unless clear lex 
specialis can be discerned as overriding such lex generalis. 
18 Cf the Barcelona Traction Case (Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction Light 
and Power Company, Limited) (Second Phase)(Belgium v Spain), International 
Court of Justice, 5 February 1970, ICJ Rep 1970, 4, as the authoritative ICJ 
judgment defining the nationality of a company for international law purposes. 
19 Cf resp Art 91, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereafter 
UNCLOSIII), Montego Bay, adopted 30 April 1982, opened for signature 10 
December 1982, entered into force 16 November 1994; 21 ILM 1261 (1982); Art 
17, Convention on International Civil Aviation (hereafter Chicago Convention), 
Chicago, done 7 December 1944, entered into force 4 April 1947; 15 UNTS 296; 
TlAS 1591. 
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Registration Convention of 1975 (which essentially elaborates Article 
VlII of the Outer Space Treaty) excludes the possibility of multiple 
registrationsz0 - just as double nationality for ships and aircraft is not 
acceptable under the respective regimes, too.z1 
Most importantly, as ArticleVIII of the Outer Space Treaty and Article 
I1 of the Registration Convention jointly make clear, the registration 
of a space object leads to the retention of jurisdiction of the registration 
state over the space object. Registration of space objects therefore 
is a matter for states; in every other case the retention of jurisdiction- 
provision immediately causes difficultie~.~~ 
In other words: the effect of Article VIII amounts to quasi-nationality. 
States are entitled to extend any national legislation based on the 
personality principle and operating in rem to space objects registered 
with them. The sovereign right to  register space objects is linked 
here to  the sovereign right to  exercise jurisdiction on a personal 
basis. 
The effect of Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty on jurisdictional 
issues, however, does not stop there. The quasi-nationality provided 
to a space object by registration in effect results in a quasi-territorial 
status of the space object in question. The retention of jurisdiction 
under Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, namely, also extends to 
'personnel thereof', just as if the space object was a floating piece 
of (quasi-) territory of the registration state. This is, of course, similar 
to the legal status of ships or aircraft. 
The exact scope of the phrase 'personnel' has only recently become 
an issue, in the sense that certain human beings in outer space can 
hardly be called 'personnel' since this concerns such unqualified and 
untrained passengers as  journalists or millionaires. The ten- 
dency however is clearly to stretch the scope of 'personnel' s o  as 
to include also non-astronaut passengers, ie, so  as to read 'all humans'. 
20 See Art II(2), Registration Convention. 
21 Cf resp Art 92(2), UNCLOSIII; Art 18, Chicago Convention. 
22 Art VII, Registration Convention, does allow intergovernmental organisations 
to act as de facto registration-state for the purposes of the Convention. However, 
this still requires the majority of the member states t o  be a party to  both the 
Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention itself; whereas para 2 calls 
for states to trytoensure that in appropriatecases intergovernmental organisations 
do take steps to  accept rights and obligations under the convention. In practice 
it will be hard to imagine any intergovernmental organisation to  take such a 
step as  envisaged underArtVI1 against the will of at  least a majority of its member 
states, which in turn means that likely the core issue of jurisdiction will also 
be dealt with. 
34 Singapore Journal of International & Comparative LAW (2001) 
The exact scope of the phrase 'thereof' meanwhile is beyond doubt 
larger than only 'on board thereof'. In other words, as long as the 
presence of a person in outer space - during a moon walk or an extra- 
vehicular activity for example - can be unequivocally traced back to 
a particular space object, the state of registration of that space object 
continues to be allowed to 'retain jurisdiction and control' over such 
person. 
The result is that this instrument for states to exercise a certain 
measure of legal control over activities in outer space shows consid- 
erable similarity to the concept of territoriality, in spite of the clear 
exclusion of that concept from the area of outer space as such. It even 
stretches such a concept of quasi-territoriality so  as to include those 
temporarily outside the 'quasi-territory' under consideration. Sover- 
eignty, even territorial sovereignty, thus creeps into outer space through 
the backdoor, albeit so  far limited to space objects and 'personnel' 
therefrom. This might lead to problems once specific space objects 
are established as more or less fixed and permanent bases on eg, the 
moon, vis-ri-ois the principled unlawfulness of exercising sovereignty 
over any part of the moon as  such. 
VIII. THE PROBLEMS WITH INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW RESPONSIBILITY 
In sum, private 'national activities' should essentially comprise 'ac- 
tivities undertaken by nationals of that state', as subject to  that state's 
personal jurisdiction, 'activities undertaken from the territory of that 
state', as subject to that state's territorial jurisdiction, and 'activities 
undertaken with the involvement of space objects registered in that 
state', as subject to  that state's quasi-personal viz, quasi-territorial 
jurisdiction." Such an interpretation would allow states to effectuate 
their international responsibilities for private space activities best. It 
should be pointed out that the 'space activities' considered here do 
not only encompass launch activities, but for instance satellite com- 
munications and remote sensing as  well.24 This interpretation could 
be summarised by the following schematic representation. 
23 Cf also Wassenbergh, Principles, 23, at note 5. 
24 This represents one major reason for not concurring with an interpretation of 
'national activities' of a state as the activities for which that state can be 
considered a 'launching state', as the last interpretation would -at best - make 
sense only for national launching activities. 
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Table A. Space law responsibility and the control of private space activities 
However ... no definition (of the non-governmental 'national activities' 
of a state, for which it is to  be held responsible) has actually been 
put forward by the Outer Space Treaty, or for that matter by any other 
space law document. Consequently, there is no agreement as  to the 
interpretation of this term.25 This absence of a generally accepted 
interpretation de facto allows individual states, where applicable, t o  
interpret the term at their own discretion. And indeed, divergingnational 
interpretations and resulting different implementations in national 
space legislation have emerged in actual fact.26 
25 Cf for various common interpretations eg, Wassenbergh, Principles, 23; Cheng, 
The Commercial Development, 36-40; H Qizhi, Certain Legal Aspects of 
Commercialization of Space Activities, (1990) 15 Annals o f  Air and Space Law, 
337; H L  van Traa-Engelman, Commercial Utilization of OuterSpace (1993), 
281-2. 
26 See for more details eg, the author's Future Developments Relating to OuterSpace 
Treaties, in Proceedings of the Fortieth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 
(1998), 449-53, discussing national United States, Swedish, British, Russian and 
South African space laws from this perspective. 
Basis for 
exercise of 
jurisdiction 
Territorial 
jurisdiction 
Personal 
jurisdiction 
Registration- 
based 
jurisdiction 
Absence of 
jurisdiction 
International rapon- 
sibility for those 
categories of private 
space activities? 
If 'national activities' 
include 'activities 
undertaken from 
territory' 
If 'national activities' 
include 'activities 
undertaken by 
nationals' 
If 'national 
activities' include 
'activities undertaken 
with nationally- 
registered space 
objects' 
Not necessary 
Relevant 
categories of 
Private 
space activities 
Activities 
undertaken from 
territory of a 
state 
Activities 
undertaken by 
nationals of a 
state 
Activities 
involving space 
objects 
registered with 
a state 
All other 
activities 
Subjects of possible 
exercise of jurisdiction 
by that state - ie, 
national space legislation 
Private entities 
undertaking space 
activities from territory 
of that state 
Private entities having 
nationality of that state 
undertaking space 
activities 
Private entities 
undertaking space 
activities involving 
space objects registered 
with that state 
No one, in principle 
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Similarly, and in close connection with the issue of 'national ac- 
tivities', there is the issue of 'the appropriate State' as dealt with by 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty. This state has to authorise and 
continuously supervise activities undertaken by non-governmental 
entities, authorisation and continuing supervision unequivocally 
being forms of the  exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, whichever s tate  
would be 'the appropriate State', it would be required to actually 
exercise jurisdiction. However, whichever state would be the 'appre 
priate state' is precisely the question, since this key phrase of Article 
Vl is not defined authoritatively, either in the Outer Space Treaty or 
anywhere else. Hence, uncertainty at the theoretical level might lead 
to national discretion at the level of implementati~n.~' 
As argued, the most logical interpretation of 'national activities' 
should imply that states are internationally responsible for those private 
activities falling under their respective (territorial, personal and 
registration-based) jurisdictions. Since the 'appropriate state' would 
actually be obliged to exercise such jurisdiction, it follows that this 
would concern the responsible state in case there is only one state 
to be held responsible in respect of a particular private activity. The 
term 'appropriate state', on the other hand, is explicitly used in its 
singular form. Therefore, in cases where two (or more) states can be 
held responsible for the same private activity - for example one on 
the basis of territorial jurisdiction, another on the basis of personal 
jurisdiction - only one of the responsible states actually would be 
obliged to  exercise its jurisdiction. 
The resulting differentiation between having jurisdiction and being 
obliged to exercise it would not effect international responsibility. Both 
states under whose jurisdictions a certain private activity has occurred 
would remain internationally responsible if that activity violates 
international space law. This holds true also for the state not being 
27 See for differing interpretations eg, HA Wassenbergh, The Law Governing 
International Private Commercial Activities o f  Space Transportation, (1991) 21 
Journal of  Space Law, 1089; V Kayser, An Achievement o f  Domestic Space Law: 
US Regulation o f  Ph'vate Commercial Launch Providers, (1991) 16 Annals o f  Air 
andspace Law, 343; KH Bcickstiegel, The Term 'Appropriate State' in International 
Space Law, in Proceedings o f  the Thirty-Seventh Colloquium on the Law of Outer 
Space (1995), 77-9; Hobe, 157-9; Cheng, The Commercial Development, 36-8; S 
Gorove, Liability in Space Law: an Overview, (1983) 8 Annals of  Air and Space 
Law, 377-8; MG Bourtly, RulesoflnternationalLaw Governingthe Commercialization 
of Space Activities, in Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Colloquium on the Law 
of  Outer Space (1989, 159-60. 
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the 'appropriate state ' ,  for it still could have exercised juris- 
diction and issue relevant controlling legislation. It even holds true 
in cases where responsible states would have decided, in deviation 
from the principle provided by Article VI, to have a third state acting 
as the appropriate state actually exercising authorisation and continu- 
ing s u p e r v i s i ~ n . ~ ~  
In conclusion, Article VI does indeed provide an important part of 
the framework for binding private entities t o  international space 
law. It defines the categories of non-governmental, that is, private 
activities for which a particular state will be held responsible - at least 
in the abstract. That is at the same time where problems begin. To 
the extent that the state under consideration should be deemed the 
appropriate state, Article V1 effectively obliges that s ta te  to  make 
private ent i t ies  in law adhere  t o  t h e  corpus juris spatialis 
internationalis. However, the key terms defining the scope of such 
domestic implementation lack precision or even consensus as to a 
general interpretation. It remains to  be seen,  to  what extent this 
remains a merely theoretical problem or has, at least potentially, 
profound consequences for private involvement in space activities. 
IX. ARTICLE VII OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY, THE LIABILITY 
CONVENTION AND STATE LIABILITY 
Apart from the general issue of international responsibility, states will 
also want to deal with the potential international liability, which arises 
from private space activities. Liability, to the extent it has been dealt 
with by international space law, operates on the public level also, with 
no private liability whatsoever being involved - but in a manner distinct 
from that of (general) international responsibility. Therefore, space 
law liability apart from its substantive contents presents a particular 
form of accountability in addition to resp~nsibi l i ty .~~ 
28 Cf HA Wassenbergh, Public Law Aspects o f  Private Space Activities and Space 
Transportation in the Future, in Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Colloquium on 
the Law of Outer Space (1996), 246: a launching state could be qualified as an 
'appropriate state' because of its quality as a launching state, and in spite of 
it not being the state whose 'national activities' are under consideration under 
appropriate definitions. 
29 Alternatively, it may be seen as presenting a form of responsibility which deals 
with material damage inflicted by space objects, separated from other, more 
general forms of responsibility by the terms of space law. 
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Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty provides that states are 'in- 
ternationally liable for damage to another State (...) or its natural and 
juridical persons', if such damage is caused by relevant space objects.30 
This clause is elaborated by the Liability Convention, affirming that 
states are the only entities3' which can possibly incur international 
liability as 'launching  state^'.^^ 
Which particular state or states are to be held liable in respect of 
a specific space object causing damage is determined by a well- 
known and quite precise fourfold criterion provided by ArticleVII itself. 
These relate to  the state which 'launches' the space object, the state 
which 'procures the launching' of that space object, the state 'from 
whose territory' the launching of that space object occurs, and the 
state from whose 'facility' that space object is launched. 
The problems with a view to dealing with private space activities by 
law do not lie in lack of precision in defining the liable states: they 
lie in the implementation of this fourfold definition in cases where 
private entities are fundamentally involved in the launch of the space 
object causing damage at a particular juncture. How far does a particular 
state have to go in exercising legal control over (in other words: 
establish some sort of national space legislation with regard to) private 
space enterprise in order to cover its potential liabilities at the in- 
ternational level? 
For the purpose of analysis every activity should be envisaged as 
being either a state activity or a private activity. With respect to  the 
first criterion for becoming liable under international space law, either 
a state or a non-state entity would be seen to launch the space object 
under consideration. In the former case, the state concerned is liable 
itself. In the latter case, it is questionable whether any entity is liable 
30 Cf also CQ Christol, The Modern International Law of Outer Space (1982). 
90-1; Horbach, eg, 28. 
31 With the exception, of course, under circumstances, of international 
intergovernmental organisations; see Art XXII, Liability Convention. Since this 
still concerns public entities, not legally authorised or supervised moreover 
through a single sovereign jurisdiction, this does not detract from the public 
character of international space law, and therefore is of little consequence for 
the issue of private space activities here. 
32 See Art I(c), Liability Convention. 
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at all under this criterion of Article VII." In consequence, no state might 
feel obliged for example to provide for any recourse of financial 
consequences by means of national space legislation in this respect. 
The impact on private participation in launches will be obvious. The 
second criterion, of procuring the launch,34 leads to a similar result. 
To the extent that states fall under this heading themselves, they are 
held liable. To the extent that non-state entities procure or co-procure 
the launch at issue, no recourse might be necessary, if international 
liability would be seen to apply to no particular state under this 
criterion. No state would then be held liable internationally in the case 
of private entities procuring a launch, unless it is liable itself under 
any of the other criteria.35 
The same holds true finally for the fourth criterion presented by 
Article VII. Launch facilities may be privately owned, which might result 
in no entity being liable under this criterion for any damage -caused 
by space objects launched from such facilities. No state would incur 
international liability for the  acts  of private entities with launch 
facilities. If the launch facilities are on the other hand government 
33 Unless one takes 'a state which launches' to  mean to  include 'a state whose 
private entities launch'; cf amongst many also V Kayser, Private Inooloement in 
Commercial Space Activities, Legal Issues and Recent Trends, in Proceedings of 
the Thirty-Seventh Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1995), 317-8. Contra 
for example is HA Wassenbergh, see eg, Principles, 91. A wide interpretation 
of 'a s t a t e  which launches' would come u p  against t h e  arguments that ,  
contrary to Art VI, Outer Space Treaty, Art VII does not refer explicitly or  even 
implicitly to private entities, and on the other hand does refer to activities not 
completely or predominantly taking place in outer space, which might include 
private activities much more readily. Also, the question would arise as to  which 
categories of private entities the word 'whose' would refer: entities with the 
nationality of, or operating from the territory of, or  both, or yet another 
category? 
34 'Procurement' should be defined as 'bringing about', by paying for it or  making 
it happen by other means; cf, also eg, Christol, 105; Qizhi, 337; KH BBckstiegel, 
The Term 'Launching State' in International Space Law, in Proceedings of the 
Thirty-Seventh Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1995), 81-2. 
35 This holds true of course, unless one interprets 'procurement' even wider, s o  
as  to  include 'effectively allowing its private entities to  bring about'; cf eg, 
BBckstiegel, The Term 'Launching State', 81-2; WB Wirin, Practical Implications 
of Launching State-Appropriate State Definitions, in Proceedings of the Thirty- 
Seventh Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space (1995), 111. Here, the same 
arguments as  put forward supra, in note 33, would be valid. In any case, another 
issue offering itself for discussion of more exact and authoritative interpretation 
arises here. 
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property, the state concerned obviously will be held liable. Thus, the 
three aforementioned criteria operate along the same lines: they apply 
either to a state itself - but then such a state is actively involved, 
'in the know' and hence able to take any desired measures. Or, arguably, 
no state is liable under these criteria - and would see no need for 
further legislative measures uis-ci-uis these private activities. Of course, 
these criteria do not work in isolation: it is obvious therefore that 
in respect of all of these three criteria, recourse in principle would 
be desirable for a state to the extent it could be held liable itself under 
any of the remaining criteria. For example, launch activities which are 
both privately conducted and privately procured, may use governmen- 
tal launch facilities. The state owning such a launch facility will be 
held liable for damage caused by any space object launched from this 
facility, and thus will have a clear interest in the legal regulation of 
such private launches. On the other hand, the launch facility cannot 
be used without a conscious approval of the government in question, 
at least de facto. Therefore, such regulation could also be established 
by means of a launch agreement for each individual case; the con- 
tractual approach might suffice here. This situation is radically different 
with respect to  the remaining criterion for becoming a liable entity 
as presented by Article VII, which applies exclusively to states: only 
states can possess 'territory' in the international public legal sense 
of the word. As long as all launches are conducted from some state 's 
territory, there will always be a state liable under this criterion, 
even in case of (otherwise) completely private launches. This led 
Professor Kerrest de Rozavel to characterise the territorial criterion 
for becoming a 'launching state' as the 'safety device'36 or even the 
' l o ~ k ' ~ ~ o n  the system from the perspective of victims: they would always 
be able to find at least one state qualifying as launching state and 
therefore liable to pay compensation. As will be seen, however, this 
need no longer be automatically the case. The above analysis leads 
to the following schematic illustration of the structural aspects of 
liability. 
36 See A Kerrest de Rozavel, The Launch of Spacecraft from the Sea, in Outlook 
on Space Law over the Next 30 Years (Eds G Lafferranderie &D Crowther)(l997), 
230. 
37 See A Kerrest de Rozavel, Launching Spacecraft from the Sea and the Outer Space 
Treaty: the Sea Launch Project, in Proceedings of the Fortieth Colloquium on 
the Law of Outer Space (1998), 269. 
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Table B. Space law liability and the control of private space activities 
In conclusion, Article VII thus may present us with a much more 
clearly defined part of the framework for binding private entities to 
international space law than Article VI does - albeit only for the special 
cases of damage caused by space objects. At the same time, it is much 
more complicated, when it comes to private participation in launches 
- let alone a fully-privately conducted launch. 
Basis for 
exercise of 
jurisdiction 
Territorial 
jurisdiction 
Personal 
jurisdiction 
Registration- 
based 
jurisdiction 
Absence of 
jurisdiction 
Subjects of possible 
exercise of jurisdiction 
by that state - ie, 
of national legislation 
+ Private entities 
undertaking launching 
activities from territory 
of that state 
+ Private entities 
undertaking any other 
space activities from 
territory of that state only 
to the extent it qualifies 
as launching state 
Private entities having 
nationality of that state 
undertaking launching 
activities only to the 
extent it qualifies as 
launching state 
Private entities 
undertaking space 
activities involving 
space objects registered 
with that state (ie, 
registration should 
include licensing 
obligation) 
Possible as far as 
allowed by relevant 
arrangements; reauired 
to the extent it 
qualifies as launching 
state 
Relevant 
categories of 
Private space 
activities 
Activities 
undertaken from 
territory of a 
state 
Activities 
undertaken by 
nationals of a 
state 
Activities 
involving space 
objects 
registered with 
a state 
All other 
activities 
International 
liability for those 
categories of private 
space activities? 
+ Launching: yes 
+ All other space 
activities: only, if 
that state qualifies 
as launching state 
Only, if that state 
qualifies as 
launching state 
By definition 
If that state 
qualifies as 
launching 
state ... ! 
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Such problems might seem academic and rather theoretical but will 
be  of practical concern especially in parts of the world where sovereign 
states are rapidly coming to terms with private partners in outer space 
activities, including launching. To see how the implicit structure of 
international space law vis-ii-uis private enterprise as resulting from 
the twin concepts of responsibility and liability would further operate 
in practice, and might lead to difficulties of a serious nature, two recent 
specific developments will be dealt with. 
XI. PROBLEMS IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF SEA LAUNCH 
Firstly, it turns out that the 'safety device' or 'lock' provided by the 
territorial criterion as regards the establishment of liability is no longer 
fool-proof: it can be circumvented by moving a fully private launch 
out to the high seas, as the case of Sea Launch shows. 'Territory' in 
a legal sense is not involved; at best, it could be argued that the 
moveable launching platform of Sea Launch constitutes 'quasi-terri- 
tory' of the state of registration -which is Liberia. Even if this would 
be accepted, what remains of the often-praised victim-orientation of 
the Liability Convention if one considers Liberia is neither party nor 
signatory to  any of the space law treaties? 
The  Sea Launch consortium itself, by contrast ,  because of 
i ts  registration in the Cayman Islands, has a British nationality. Would 
the United Kingdom perhaps be liable if Sea Launch's launches cause 
damage, in view of the nationality of Sea Launch and the United Kingdom 
for that reason qualifying as  the 'State which launches'? Apparently, 
at  the outset, the United Kingdom did not consider this to be the case, 
as Sea Launch was left to go ahead without being required to operate 
under a license under the UK Outer Space Act of 1986.38 
However, once the British authorities got wind that they should 
perhaps (have) require(d) Sea Launch to operate under a UK license, 
since they might be held accountable for its operations under inter- 
national space law, the result was a considerable delay for the private 
consortium. SeaLaunch was, after its test flight had gone unobstructed, 
stopped in midcourse towards its first commercial launch by the 
obligation imposed by the UK government to  obtain a UK license after 
all, and could proceed only after that had been arranged. 
38 Outer Space Act, 1986 (UK), 1986, c 38; Space Law - Basic Legal Documents, 
El; 36 Zeitschrift fiir Luft- und Weltraumrecht (1987), at 12. See esp ss 2(1), 3(1) 
& (3). 
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Certainly with respect to  the test flight, we may therefore consider 
it fortuitous from a legal point of view that the United States had itself 
- for reasons largely of an economic and political nature - taken the 
initiative earlier, and obliged Boeing CSC, as the largest shareholder 
in Sea Launch, to apply for a license under the US Commercial Space 
Launch Act.39 After all, strictly legally speaking the 40% share of Boeing 
does not make the United States a launching state in regard of Sea 
Launch even under an extensive interpretation of 'the State which 
launches', as it does not detract from Sea Launch's British nationality: 
it does not provide Sea Launch with the US nationality or make it a 
'US entity'. Since moreover neither US territory nor US facilities are 
used for the launch, and procurement by the United States or even 
a private US company would be merely accidental, the United States 
would not automatically qualify as a 'launching State' in respect of 
any or all of Sea Launch's activities. 
Would, on the other hand, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and 
the concept of international responsibility change this evaluation? 
Could the activities of Sea Launch, by virtue of the British nationality 
of Sea Launch, by virtue of the registration of the launching platform 
in Liberia, or by virtue of the 40% share of Boeing in Sea Launch, be 
seen as 'national activities in outer space' of, respectively, the United 
Kingdom, Liberia and the United States? Furthermore, could that re- 
sponsibility ever entail an obligation to pay for damages on the part 
of these states even if they would not fall within the scope of application 
of Article VII and the Liability Convention? 
What, finally, if the 40% share of Boeing would lead to United States 
responsibility for Sea Launch activities: would that be a 100% respon- 
sibility, or would not Norway, the Ukraine and Russia each also bear 
some responsibility, in view of the shares held by Kvaerner Moss, NPO 
Yuzhnoye and RSC Energia, respectively? 
This brings to the fore the problems hiding behind the system of 
Article VII, which causes a particular state to be internationally liable 
for damage as long as the launches of the space object causing the 
damage are conducted by it, or are procured by it, or are undertaken 
from either its territory or its facility (whether under a restrictive or 
wide interpretation). The private entities involved in this way in such 
launches are, therefore, the ones with respect to which a state needs 
- 
39 Commercial Space Launch Act, Public Law 98575,98th Congress, HR 3942,30 
October 1984; 98 Stat 3055; Space Law - Basic Legal Documents. E 111 3. See esp 
s 6(a). 
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to establish national space legislation in order to deal with their liability. 
Yet it is far from clear, t o  what extent and for which categories of 
private activities respectively private entities of any particular state 
would need to  take such measures. 
These problems and uncertainties are further compounded by the 
fact that it is the responsibility system provided by Article VI, not 
the liability system of Article VII and the Liability Convention, which 
obliges states t o  authorise and continuously supervise non-govern- 
mental entities. Establishment of national space laws, including licens- 
ing regimes as  the most efficient and comprehensive means for a state 
to take care of international liability on the domestic level, is referred 
to in thecontext of international responsibility. The relationship between 
state responsibility and state liability under space law, however, has 
never been authoritatively defined.40 
XII. PROBLEMS I N  PRACTISE: 
SATELLITE LEASING AND SALESON-ORBIT 
Secondly, another recent phenomenon, arising within the satellite 
communications sector but with considerable impact on the launching 
sector might be illustrative of the problems which could arise from 
the  complexity of t h e  twin concepts of international responsi- 
bility and liability. The fourfold definition of t h e  liable s t a t e  
is established, in a fashion, through the notion of launching. This 
makes sense perhaps where the launching phase is the most prominent 
phase of any space activity, and the states involved in the launching 
in a substantial  way (as defined by t h e  four criteria) a re  t h e  
only relevant enti t ies concerned. 
The liability regime provided by the Liability Convention, however, 
effectively amounts t o  'once a launchingstate (and hence liable), always 
a launching state (and hence liable)'.41 With the increasing life span 
of satellites, a growing practice of leasing or even selling satellites 
40 Reference may be had to the author's Liability Versus Responsibility in Space 
Law: Misconception or Misconstruction?, in Proceedings o f  the Thirty-Fourth 
Colloquium on the Law o f  Outer Space (1992), 363-71, which represented a first 
effort to map the complexity and problems regarding this issue. 
41 Cf also eg, the author's The Illogical Link: Launching, Liability and Leasing, in 
Proceedings o f  the Thirty-Sixth Colloquium on the Law o f  Outer Space (1994). 
354; and Loopholes in Liability? Aspects o f  Liability for Damage Sustained in the 
Course ofSatellite Telecommunications Activities, 2 Telecommunications &Space 
Journal (1995), 163, and note 30. 
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while in orbit may be discerned. Thus, a conceptual separation for 
legal purposes between the launching phase and the operational phase 
of a satellite, after launch, is increasingly feasible and logical. A state 
may for example be involved only in the launching of a telecommu- 
nication satellite to the extent of allowing its territory to be used. Would 
it still be valid to hold that state liable if the operators of that satellite 
(whether another state or its private entities) by their operations cause 
damage to third states (or their entities) some years after that launch 
has occurred? This question becomes even more salient, if the o p  
erators have only started operating the satellite after leasing or buying 
it in orbit from the original operators, and therefore need not have 
any (direct) legal relationship with the launching state! On the other 
hand, under most interpretations of Article VI, such operations would 
entail the state responsibility of the operator state, even if the operator 
was a private entity, as being a 'national activity in outer space'. 
Of course, problems of derogation of liability or other legal con- 
sequences can be taken care of by contractual relations between the 
various launching states, and provisions taking care of in-orbit lease 
or sale. Yet, the complicated legal chains which would thus arise would 
threaten the consistency and uniformity of dealing with damage caused 
by space activities. In addition, they would perhaps unnecessarily 
obstruct the solution in practice of any dispute in this respect, since 
every element in the chain would tend to give rise to its own delays 
and disputes. The question would have to be asked what then would 
remain of the professed victim-orientation of the space law-liability 
regime. 
In conclusion, while national space legislation crucially involving 
licensing regimes and/or, under circumstances, relevant contractual 
arrangements would clearly provide an efficient means of dealing with 
private involvement in space activities, the problems arise at the 
international level where the  exact contours and scope of such 
fundamental concepts of 'responsibility', 'liability', 'national activities' 
and 'launching state' are far from clear. As discussed, this situation 
has led to considerable divergence in those few national space law 
regimes which have been established, and probably also to the absence 
of national space legislation where one would be desirable. 
XIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Though the foregoing analysis is far from comprehensive and final, 
it can be concluded in the Asian context that international law does 
not principally obstruct private space activities, and actually in some 
ways is quite conducive thereto. The fundamental freedom to undertake 
space activities applies, in principle, to private space activities also; 
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the  related obligations posed by Article VI of authorisation and 
continuing supervision as such are principally a concern for states. 
Once states  have taken up the baton and s tar t  to  exercise some 
substantial measure of authorisation and supervision-in other words, 
jurisdiction- the question becomes acute for private enterprise, whether 
this freedom has also been translated on the national and private level. 
The twin concepts of state responsibility for activities not in con- 
formity with any rule pronounced - including private activities - 
and state liability for damage caused by space objects - including space 
objects run by private operators - is perhaps the most fundamental 
issue of international space law from the perspective of privatisation 
of space activities. This twin concept forces (or at least induces) the 
relevant states to take domestic action to monitor and control those 
activities for which they could be held accountable at the international 
level. Yet, it has been shown to suffer from considerable uncertainties 
and inconsistencies. This also threatens private enterprise's interests, 
in stable, coherent, transparent and uniform legal regulation of their 
activities and an (ultimately perhaps worldwide) level playing field. 
The almost comprehensive absence of substantive provisions 
specifically circumscribing private space activities at the level of the 
core instruments of international space law means that a large margin 
of discretion remains for individual states on a national level. They 
are free to legislate domestically in a liberal fashion, to  accord with 
international principles, or in a restrictive fashion, since these prin- 
ciples can hardly be seen to prohibit restrictive national implemen- 
tation. Launching as a space activity certainly is included in this 
analysis. 
The major legal tools to achieve legal control are territorial juris- 
diction (to the extent space activities are still largely conducted by 
humans in earth-bound launch centres, tracking-andcontrol stations 
and uplink facilities), personal jurisdiction over entities with 
the  nationality of the particular state and registration-based juris- 
diction over relevant space objects. The best way to achieve such 
legal control in turn is through establishment of a licensing system 
as part of a national space law, providing for the necessary controls 
and safeguards. So far, only eight states have done s o  in a more or 
less comprehensive fashion: the United States, Norway, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, South Africa, the Ukraine 
and Australia. In addition, France has established a 'quasi-national' 
and (because of substantial involvement of the European Space 
Agency and its other member states) rather complicated arrangement 
uis4-uis Arianespace, dealing at least with liability. 
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France is also, along with Germany, Italy, Brazil, India and Japan, 
currently seriously considering the establishment of some focused 
body of national space legislation. This still leaves a number of states 
where private participation in space activities has become substantial 
-a number which is moreover growing- but not yet taking any domestic 
legislative activities oisd-uis those private activities for which they 
might be held responsible and/or liable at the international level. It 
is submitted, that this is at  least partly the  consequence of  the 
uncertainties and inconsistencies detected at  the  international 
level. 
Finally, the interaction between international and national legislation 
on issues of outer space and space activities is crucial if the entry 
of private enterprise in the space arena is to be dealt with to the benefit 
both of private enterprise itself and of the public at large. A somewhat 
self-evident division of tasks suggests itself here. States are the 
obvious controllers of private enterprise in any meaningful sense of 
the word: they have the legislative machinery to establish compre- 
hensive licensing regimes and make them work - monitoring, adju- 
dicatingand if necessaryenforcing them. In terms of substance, moreover, 
there would be many areas sensibly left to the discretion of individual 
states, to give substance to specific national political, social, economic, 
philosophical or cultural ideas. 
It should be left to  the international level, however, to  define the 
parameters and scope within which such a control of private space 
activities should take place. This applies to issues of substance where 
a number of topics have been touched upon, which call for substantial 
uniformity at the international level or for some international regulation 
in the first place. It applies even more to issues of structure, where 
states should have minimal discretion in deciding implicitly or explic- 
itly, which categories of private activities they feel they could be held 
accountable for at the international level. 
